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During the last decade, forced internal displacement in Colombia has been a growing 
phenomenon closely linked to the escalation of the internal armed conflict - particularly in 
rural areas. The displacement problem has affected nearly every region and vulnerable 
groups of the population. Two emerging policy questions are whether the magnitude of 
the response to this problem has been proportional to its size and to what extent the 
instruments chosen are the most adequate to address it.  The purpose of this paper is 
twofold. First, to identify the determinants of displacement behavior and to compare 
these findings with standard migration literature. Second, to estimate the burden or 
welfare losses of displacement. Empirical evidence shows that the welfare loss of 
displacement is considerable and amount to 37 percent of the net present value of rural 
lifetime aggregate consumption for the average household. This loss is estimated for 
each household with a method that derives welfare changes from behavioral model 
estimates – widely used in environmental economics. Our empirical findings also show 
that the level of violence at the origin site is not only the dominant factor of displacement 
behavior, but also that in a violent environment other migration determinants have the 
opposite effect, relative to the one expected by the migration literature in a non-violent 
context. That is, the violent environment modifies the migration incentives for risk 
aversion, access to information, the planning horizon, and location-specific assets – 
human and non-human. 
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Durante la última década, el fenómeno del desplazamiento forzado en Colombia 
ha exhibido una tendencia creciente, ligada a la intensificación del conflicto 
armado, en particular en las áreas rurales. El problema del desplazamiento ha 
afectado la gran mayoría de las regiones y de los grupos vulnerables de la 
población. Dos preguntas relevantes para fortalecer la política pública han sido 
ignoradas hasta el momento. En primer lugar, es importante establecer si la 
respuesta estatal se compadece con la magnitud del problema del 
desplazamiento. En segundo lugar, se debe explorar si los instrumentos 
adoptados hasta el momento son los más adecuadas para abordar el fenómeno 
del desplazamiento. Dado lo anterior, los objetivos de este artículo son identificar 
los determinantes del desplazamiento, por un lado, y estimar las pérdidas de 
bienestar de la población desplazada, por otro. La evidencia empírica revela que 
las pérdidas de bienestar causadas por el desplazamiento son considerables y 
ascienden a 37 por ciento del valor presente neto del consumo agregado rural de 
toda una vida. Dichas pérdidas se estiman para cada hogar con un método que 
deriva los cambios de bienestar de modelos de utilidad aleatoria, usados en la 
economía ambiental. Asimismo, los resultados indican que la violencia no solo 
es un factor dominante en la decisión de migrar, sino además modifica los 
incentivos de los determinantes tradicionales de migración y su efecto es el 
contrario al esperado. Ello implica que en un contexto de violencia los incentivos 
tradicionales de la migración, tales como la aversión al riesgo, el acceso a la 
información, el horizonte de planeación y los activos específicos al lugar de 
origen, producen el efecto contrario al esperado.   
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 Ya no vive nadie en ella, y a la orilla del camino silenciosa está la casa. (...)  
los que fueron la alegría y el calor de aquella casa se marcharon para siempre 
 unos muertos y otros vivos, que tenían muerta el alma. 
Melancholic Colombian folk song (Las Acacias)1 
1. Introduction 
Despite the massive global attention international wars attract, today the world 
faces mostly civil wars (Collier et al, 2003). As a direct consequence, the victims 
of the conflict are increasingly civil population in contrast to military personnel 
(Cairns, 1997). Armed groups deliberately target civilians to induce forced 
migrations because they need the loot to augment resources and to reduce the 
fighting capacity of the enemy (Azam and Hoefler, 2002). By 2002, due to civil 
conflicts, nearly 34.8 million people were forced to seek asylum in another 
country or within the national borders; 21.8 million of them were displaced 
population
2 (USCR, 2003).  
Colombia confronts one of the largest numbers of displaced population in the 
world. During the last fifteen years, involuntary displacement affected at least 1.8 
million and corresponds to 4.3 percent of the country’s population and 14 percent 
of the rural population (Arboleda and Correa, 2003).  However, intensification of 
the political conflict and its expansion to a vast majority of the territory is causing 
displacement numbers to grow at a larger pace than before.  As a result, by 
2001, 74 percent of Colombian municipalities were expulsion or reception sites. 
The toll of displacement falls heavily upon vulnerable groups of the population: 
women, children and ethnic minorities are respectively 49, 49 and 38 percent of 
this population (RSS,2002). In fact, in the late 1990’s recent migrants 
                                                 
1 Composed by J. Molina based on poems by Vicente Medina, Spanish poet who wrote about 
migration and wars during the first half of the 20
th century. See, 
http://www.geocities.com/gsilvam/canciones.htm and http://www.gh.profes.net/archivo2 
.asp?id_contenido=23944) 
2 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1999) describes a displaced person as 
anyone who has been forced to migrate within the national boundaries, leaving aside her 
residence or her habitual economic activities because either her life, her physical integrity or her 
freedom have been either violated or threatened by situations such as armed conflict, generalized 
violence, violation of human rights, and any other situation that may alter public order.  (presumably, internally displaced people) fared worse than the urban poor, in 
clear contrast with the traditional migrant profile, who used to enjoy better welfare 
than the urban population up to 1995 (see Vélez, 2002, Table 7.) 
This paper seeks to address three main questions.  First, it establishes whether 
displacement is a casual by-product of the conflict, therefore it is randomly 
targeted, or whether displacement is a war strategy and, as such, it is targeted to 
specific groups of the population.  Second, it identifies the key determinants of 
the displacement process.  Understanding the determinants of the process might 
shed some light on possible policy instruments to mitigate displacement.  For 
example, may the presence of state armed forces outweigh the effect of 
violence? Are public interventions to provide social services effective to deter 
displacement? Or displacement can only be halted once the security conditions 
are restituted to prewar levels?  Third, it estimates the burden of displacement in 
monetary terms.  The magnitude of welfare losses is relevant to justify policy 
interventions and investments.  Moreover, the size of public resources to alleviate 
displacement must take into consideration the extent of welfare losses induced 
by displacement.  By addressing these issues, the paper provides empirical 
evidence on the behavioral responses of households when confronting violence 
and on the economics costs violence places upon households.  
We find that landowners, young individuals and households with less economic 
privileges, therefore with a lower capacity to adopt defensive measures, are more 
likely to be terrorized.  Econometric regressions for the determinants of 
displacement indicate police and military forces assume differentiated roles in 
preventing displacement.  While police presence prevents displacement by 
reducing the likelihood of victimization, military presence is not instrumental to 
halt direct victimization of households.  On the other hand, military forces can 
protect the population once violence occurs and displacement is imminent.   
Welfare losses from displacement are substantial.  Compensating valuation per 
household is, on average, 37 percent of the net present value of rural aggregate consumption.  Relative welfare losses are larger for the poorer segment of the 
displaced population and for reactive displacement.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes some facts about 
displacement in Colombia and provides hypothesis on the possible causes of 
displacement.  In Section 3, we present a brief literature review on migration 
literature, discuss its relevance for modeling the displacement decision and 
present a random utility model for displacement.  Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Displacement in Colombia: Some Facts 
2.1. Internally  Displaced Population in Colombia 
Violence in Colombia has continuously aggravated since the 1970s. Homicide 
rates tripled from 1970 till 1991, forced migration reached 4.3 percent of its 
population and the civil war covers today a sizeable portion of the country’s 
territory.  The roots of violence in Colombia are complex. Illegal trade, lack of 
punishment for criminals, the presence of illegal armed groups, poverty and 
inequality and decades of civil strife are among the most frequently identified 
sources of violence in Colombia (Vélez, 2002).  However, the impact of violence 
differs between urban and rural areas. While urban areas suffer mostly from 
soaring homicide rates, the rural population endures armed confrontations, 
massacres and forced displacement.  
Few studies estimate the social and economic costs imposed by violence in 
Colombia. In fact, behavioral responses to violence, which may inflict large 
welfare losses upon the civil population, are insufficiently analyzed.  Gaviria and 
Vélez (2001) examine preventive responses of the Colombian urban population 
to escalation of crime.  Nevertheless forced migration, the most extreme and 
extended behavioral response to violence in Colombia and other countries, has 
been largely ignored by the economic literature. Our paper seeks to understand the causes of forced displacement and its associated welfare losses. This section 
describes some stylized facts about internally displaced population in Colombia.  
Violence and displacement are apparently strongly linked. To explore this, we 
classified Colombian municipalities in four categories: (i) low incidence of 
displacement and low homicide rates; (ii) low incidence of forced displacement 
and high homicide rates; (iii) high incidence of forced displacement and low 
homicide rates; and (iv) high incidence of forced displacement and high homicide 
rates
3. Table 1 shows high incidence of displacement and high homicide rates 
coincides in 57.8 percent of Colombian municipalities whereas municipalities with 
low incidence of forced migration also exhibit low homicide rates.  
Table 1. Classification of Colombian municipalities according to 
displacement and homicide rates 








High levels  33.9  57.8 
       Source: authors calculations based on municipal data 
The intensity and nature of the conflict determine this violence against civilians. 
On the one hand, when the conflict fuels, escalation of crimes against the civil 
population becomes a low cost and effective strategy to clear territories, allowing 
illegal armed groups to strengthen their control area, transport weapons, and 
develop at ease illegal activities. On the other hand, crimes against civilians are 
more frequent in contested areas with presence of antagonist armed groups. 
Crimes against civilians include death threats, massacres, forced recruitment, 
temporary town take-overs and selected homicides. 
As a consequence, displacement is a nationwide problem.  The need of illegal 
armed groups to have territorial strongholds heightened and expanded the 
conflict across the country.  As a consequence, nearly 74 percent of Colombian 
municipalities receive or force out population and with the exception of one 
                                                 
3 Municipalities are the smallest administrative unit in Colombia. Municipalities were considered to 
face high incidence of displacement or high homicide rates when its figures were above the 
national mean.  department
4, an island in the Caribbean Sea, all departments experience 
displacement problems.   
Nevertheless, intensity of displacement
5 is heterogeneous across and within 
departments.  For example, in the department exhibiting the largest displacement 
intensity ten percent of the population fled, while the department with the fifth 
highest intensity over four percent left (Figure 1).  This wide variance across 
departments suggests regional characteristics partially determine displacement 
incidence.   
Particular characteristics of households may trigger displacement as well.  Some 
socio-demographic factors and the particular social context where the household 
reside may increase the likelihood of being victimized (i.e. landownership, age of 
household members or household insertion in the community).  On the other 
hand, some households may be more risk averse and may prefer to leave their 
town to avoid being the victim of violence. 
Social context dimensions, like the probability of being victimized in a particular 
geographical context, paired with victimization are seemingly important 
determinants of displacement.  Presence of illegal armed groups appears to 
promote displacement.  Figure 2 indicates displaced households resided in 
regions where paramilitary and guerrilla presence is strong while police and 
military presence is weak
6.  Facing violence, in particular, death threats to 
household members, pushes households to seek refuge elsewhere.  Indirect 
violence, such as massacres in nearby towns or the murder of an acquaintance, 
is a source of displacement as well, but death threats play a stronger role (see 
Figure 3). 
Some household characteristics may influence the likelihood of death threats, 
victimization and displacement.  First, landowners are four times more inclined to 
                                                 
4 Departments are equivalent to states. 
5 Intensity of displacement is measured as the number of displaced population per 100.000 
inhabitants 
6 Presence of armed groups in the household’ regions is defined as a dichotomous variable equal 
to one when households perceive the presence of that particular armed group.  flee their place of residence (see Figure 4).  Apparently, illegal armed groups are 
interested in clearing territory and violently appropriating land.  Second, other 
factors, like access to social services, elevate migration costs and incentive 
residents to stay in their hometown (see Figure 5).  
2.2.  What Causes Displacement in Colombia? 
The causes of involuntary migration in Colombia are difficult to identify.   
Immediate causes or triggers are the last incident in a chain of events that 
produce the final decision to flee the hometown; yet the root of displacement 
underlies in the dynamics of the Colombian conflict.  This section describes some 
hypothesis put forth in the literature about the sources originating displacement in 
Colombia.  
Illegal armed groups and their actions against the civil population are mainly 
responsible for forced displacement.  In 2001, paramilitary groups instigated half 
of forced migrations while guerrilla and simultaneous presence of two armed 
groups originated 20 and 22 percent respectively (RSS, 2002).  Paramilitary 
groups not only bear the bulk of the responsibility, but also are more effective.  
During 2001, paramilitaries caused 599 displacement events that forced out 
91.380 people meanwhile, guerrilla groups provoked 570 events that prompted 
36.217 people to flee (RSS, 2002).  Violent actions against the civil population, 
like threats and selective homicides, trigger the decision to migrate.  However, 
armed confrontations (i.e. battles between paramilitary groups and guerrilla) 
became lately an important trigger due to the recent intensification of the conflict 
in populated areas (RSS, 2002).   
Land conflicts and violent land appropriation are considered an underlying source 
of involuntary migration (Reyes and Bejarano, 1998).   Land occupation is crucial 
in the war strategy to clear the territory from the presence of opponents, to 
expand control areas and to appropriate valuable land. This is particularly valid in 
contested territories where armed groups are attempting to establish hegemony. As a result, displaced populations report having lost four million hectares of land
7, 
which amount to one third of productive land in Colombia (PMA, 2001).  
Programs to eradicate illicit crops may also produce displacement.  Aerial 
fumigation of illicit crops
8 destroys farmers’ assets, produces a temporary shock 
to their income, and originates combats in the zone, exacerbating violence in the 
region.  Estimations indicate 13.153 people were displaced during 1999 in drug 
producing departments (Puyana, 1999).   
Forcing out population may be a war strategy to impede collective action, to 
damage social networks as well as to intimidate and control the civil population.  
Attacks on the population weaken their support for the opponent and obstruct rise 
ups of civil population (Henao et al., 1998).  Lozano and Osorio (1999) estimate 
65 percent of displaced population were active members of community 
organizations and 11 percent participated in labor and political organizations in 
their hometown.  
Rural families may involuntarily migrate to avoid forced recruitment of their 
children into illegal armed forces.  Children as young as eight years old are 
currently recruited by illegal armed groups to fight as soldiers in the Colombian 
conflict (Salazar, 2001).  After a combat in October 2001, military forces found 43 
percent of dead guerrilla members and 41 percent of captured guerrilla members 
were below 18 years of age (USCR, 2001).  
3. Modeling  Displacement as Migration 
This section discusses migration theory and develops a theoretical model for 
forced displacement. But can a model developed for voluntary migration be 
applied to an involuntary action? Displacement is a reaction to a violent attack 
and not a voluntary decision: families are fleeing to save their lives and to protect 
                                                 
7 Because displaced households have incentives to report ownership of larger farm sizes in the 
event a program of land restitution is implemented, these figures might overestimate the total 
hectares of abandoned land.  
8 Programs to eradicate illicit crops follow two strategies: (i) aerial fumigation of illicit crops; or (ii) 
manual and voluntary substitution.   Some analysts consider aerial fumigation is causing 
displacement.  their assets. Nonetheless, we encounter that in towns with acute episodes of 
violence some people migrate to seek refuge while others prefer to stay.  
Why would people enduring extreme violence episodes in their hometown prefer 
not to migrate? A possible hypothesis is that violence is not randomly targeted 
but  aimed deliberately at certain groups of the population, forcing this people to 
migrate. An alternative hypothesis is that some households do engage in a 
decision-making process to analyze whether migration is the best possible 
option. During this process, besides considering security factors, families may 
contemplate traditional migration variables as well. Both reasons are not 
necessarily exclusive. Indeed, households may be targets of armed groups, but 
may prefer to stay on their hometown and not face dire conditions in unfamiliar 
and hostile cities.  
We attempt to test whether displacement is caused solely by violence or whether 
traditional migration variables can play a role as well. This section first examines 
the traditional migration literature and discusses whether its salient conclusions 
are applicable to forced displacement.  Second, it develops a random utility 
model that combines traditional migration variables with characteristics typical of 
forced displacement.  
3.1. Comparing  Migration  and Displacement Incentives  
When migrating voluntarily, households must compare the benefits and costs 
from residing in the origin and reception sites and choose the alternative with 
larger net benefits. In the case of displacement, violence is an additional factor in 
the decision process that modifies the costs from staying at the origin site; 
consequently, modifying the impact of other migration determinants.  The 
purpose of this section is to analyze the variables identified in the literature as 
determinants of the migration decision and discuss that, in the presence of terror, 
traditional migration incentives may be outweighed by other factors or become 
less important. The impact of migration incentives are modified as violence 
reduces returns and increases risk in the site of origin particularly on individuals 
more prone to victimizations.  During the migration decision, individuals compare alternative locations and 
choose the one providing larger net benefits. Initial models (Sjaastad, 1962) 
formalized this idea by assuming individuals compared the difference in the 
present value of income streams minus the moving costs between alternative 
locations. Restraining benefits from migration to income streams limited the 
application of the migration model. Later versions of this model included other 
determinants of migration like the attractiveness of urban jobs vis-à-vis rural 
employment (Todaro, 1969). According to Todaro’s model, individuals move 
searching for attractive job opportunities in urban areas.  
Later refinements of these models discussed and extended reasons to migrate, 
which mainly affected benefits and costs of migration. First, contacts at the 
reception site and education mitigate migration costs (Becker, 1975; Todaro, 
1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987).  By providing housing, support in finding 
employment and a social network, contacts at the reception site diminish 
migration costs. Similarly, better-educated individuals may find employment more 
easily and generate larger incomes after migrating.  On the other hand, potential 
discrimination at arrival increases migration costs; thereby, discouraging 
migration
9 (Fischer et al. 1997).  Positive information about economic and social 
opportunities in the destination site improves the expected benefits from 
migration (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Dustmann, 1992; Maier, 1985).  Conversely, 
information about poor social and economic conditions in destination sites raises 
the benefits of non-migration.   
The length of the planning horizon exerts similar incentives on the decision to 
migrate and to displace, but the underlying motive differs.  Since discounted 
benefits are larger, inclination to migrate is stronger for individuals with longer 
planning horizons (Becker, 1975; Todaro, 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). In 
the case of displacement, young people are probable targets of threats, forced 
                                                 
9 In Colombian urban centers, discrimination against displaced population is particularly strong.  
Some native residents wrongly believe displaced households belong to illegal armed groups and, 
in addition, perceive this population diverts public resources previously allocated for the poor.   
 recruitment and selective homicides; therefore, increasing their likelihood to 
displace.   
Risk aversion plays an asymmetric role in the decision to migrate and to displace.  
The uncertainties inherent in arriving to an unknown place may dissuade risk 
averse individuals to migrate (Fischer et al., 1997).  Violence, in contrast, may 
induce risk averse households to displace in spite of the complications they might 
cope with in the reception site.  
Standard migration literature considers that location specific assets render 
migration costly, reducing incentives to migrate (Fischer et al, 1997).  However, 
those incentives might be reversed in an environment of deficient rule of law that 
allows illegal armed groups to violently appropriate land -particularly when left 
unprotected.  Under these special circumstances, landownership becomes a 
possible factor of victimization, causing displacement. Similarly, when the 
destruction of social networks is a war strategy, human capital turns into a risk 
factor. Analogously, permanent residency and active participation in community 
activities signify advantages when belonging to a society; discouraging migration 
to the extent that it would entail giving up these accumulated advantages 
(Fischer et al., 1997).  But, if destruction of social networks is a war strategy, high 
levels of social capital is no longer an asset but a risk factor. 
Because an armed conflict changes the benefits and costs from staying in the 
origin site or leaving to a destination, and their distribution across households’ 
characteristics at the origin site, the standard results of the migration literature 
should not remain unchanged. On the one hand, contacts at reception site, 
education, discrimination and the planning horizon determine migration and 
displacement in the same direction.  Violence, on the other hand, modifies the 
impact of access to information, risk aversion, and location specific assets on the 
migrating decision.  
Empirical evidence on the impact of violence on migration is scarce and relies 
solely on aggregated figures. Schultz (1971) explores the causes of internal 
migration rates in Colombia and finds violence, measured as the number of deaths per year, is associated with net out-migration. Estimates of the 
determinants of migration rates in Guatemala reveal political violence is a key 
determinant of migration decisions in that country (Morrison and May, 1994). 
3.2.  A Random Utility Model for Displacement
10 
Households displace when the expected utility from migrating is greater than the 
utility from staying at the origin site. Choices are based on many dimensions 
influencing household welfare. First, households examine violence levels in both 
sites and evaluate the risk the family will face when staying. Second, displaced 
families compare the economic opportunities in both places. Third, migration 
costs are assessed; the migration process demands economic and social 
investments, like loosing access to social services and leaving behind location-
specific assets. Lastly, socio-demographic characteristics shape preferences of 
the household. Household i decides whether to migrate if the utility from 
displacement is greater than the utility from staying in the origin site 
(1)     . in id U U >                                                                                 
where  ij U  denotes the indirect utility from alternative j, j=d is the reception site 
and j=n is the origin site.  The indirect utility is composed by the deterministic 
utility ( ij v ) and a random term ( ij ε ) with mean zero  
(2)     . ij ij ij v U ε + =  
Decision to displace or remain in the origin site depends on many factors.  First, 
households evaluate risks and generate expectations about security in the origin 
and destination region ( ij S ).  Second, households compare income possibilities 
and access to social services in both sites ( ij Y ).  Third, migration and information 
costs influence the decision process ( ij C ).  Finally, household characteristics 
reflecting preference on needs and risk aversion determine displacement 
behavior ( i Z ).  The observable utility is defined as 
                                                 
10This model was developed in Kirchhoff and Ibáñez (2001).     (3)     . i j ij ij j ij ij Z C Y S v γ δ β α + + + =  
Household  i  displaces when the expected utility from displacement is greater 
than the expected utility from staying in the origin site  
()( ) (4)       . in i n in in d in id i d id id d id i i Z C Y S Z C Y S prob displace prob ε γ δ β α ε γ δ β α + + + + > + + + + =
 
If we assume a logistic distribution for the error term and a linear utility function, 
the probability of displacement is  
() () ( ) ( ) []
() () () []
(5)     .
exp 1
exp
i in id in id in n id d in id
i in id in id in n id d in id
i Z C C Y Y S S
Z C C Y Y S S
displace prob
γ γ δ β β α
γ γ δ β β α
− + − + − + − +
− + − + − + −
=  
Perceptions of security can be approximated with variables indicating whether 
the household was directly threatened and whether the household is facing 
indirect violence.  Direct threats are however not randomly targeted.   
Aggressions against the civil population are a consequence of war and not an 
accidental by-product of the civil conflict (Cairns, 1997). Deliberate attacks to 
civilians seek to depopulate territory in order to obtain the loot or to reduce the 
fighting capacity of the enemy.  A careful designed strategy to appropriate 
assets, extract natural resources at ease and prevent civilians from rising up, 
implies targeting particular groups of the population like landowners, active 
members of the community or young household heads.  The probability of being 
the victim of a direct threat is defined by  
(6)     ), | , , ( ) ( Pr i in in in i Z A V L f Threat ob =  
where  in L  denotes landownership in the place of origin,  in V  represents ties in the 
place of origin and  in A  is a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of 
armed actors in the place of origin.   
Presumably, households confront large welfare losses from forced migration. 
First, assets, like land, are often abandoned because households have to flee 
hastily to protect their life and, most of the times, do not have legal property of the land
11.  Second, since displaced households are mostly rural and are trained 
to compete in rural markets, returns to human capital are lower after migration to 
urban areas. Third, access to health services and education are not easily 
regained in reception sites. This implies loosing the fix costs invested to access 
such services and, even worst, interrupting education. Lastly, the sequels of post-
traumatic syndrome, as a consequence of victimization, can hinder normal 
capabilities of displaced households. These losses, although partially manifested 
in monetary terms, are likely to be one of the most significant costs of 
displacement for the Colombian society.  If these costs to the displaced 
themselves are left out in evaluating the dimension of the problem, the policies 
implemented to alleviate displacement might still be insufficient.   
We will estimate welfare losses from displacement based on methods used 
widely in environmental economics.  The shock from displacement exhibits a 
similar structure to environmental problems.  An external shock, in this case 
violence, induces changes in behavior, which in turn impose welfare losses to 
households.  One way of measuring changes in utility in monetary units is 
compensating variation
12.  In this case, compensating variation can be 
interpreted as a measure of the willingness to accept income in exchange of 
deterioration in security conditions.  As shown by Hanemann (1982), 
compensating variation (CV) can be defined as the measure that equates the 
expected maximum utility before and after the displacement.  For the model 




i id in id in id d in n id in
i
Z C C Y Y S S
CV E
β
γ γ δ β β α ) ( ) ( ) ( − + − + − + −
=  
The theoretical contributions of the model defined above are twofold.  First, the 
random utility model permits to introduce variables never considered in migration 
models, like perceptions of security, and to establish behavioral responses to 
                                                 
11 Ibáñez and Querubin (2004) found near 53 percent of displaced households had legal title of 
their land, the remaining households had informal access to land.  
12 Compensating variation for avoiding displacement is the amount of money necessary to leave 
the individual indifferent between displacing and staying in his hometown.   
13 A complete derivation of the compensating variation is presented in Appendix I. violent events. Second, the definition of welfare losses allows policy makers to 
decide whether intervention is necessary and establishes an upper bound for 
investment funds to mitigate displacement.  The random utility model defined 
above, typically used in environmental and transport economics, allows us to 
retrieve the parameters of the utility function and, thereby, to estimate welfare 
losses.  
4.  Determinants of Displacement in Colombia and Associated Welfare 
Losses 
 
4.1. The  Data 
 
The purpose of the Survey for Internally Displaced Population
14 (SIDP-2000) was 
to identify the causes of displacement in Colombia.  Surveys were conducted in 
origin and destination sites in order to have information about displaced 
households and households who did not displace despite living in conflict zones - 
hereafter non-displaced households.  Two samples were constructed: a 
displaced and a non-displaced sample.  The questionnaires administered to 
these households covered issues that ranged from socio-economic 
characteristics of the household, victimization profile, armed actors in the region, 
access to social services in the origin and destination site, land ownership and 
agricultural production.  
The sample for displaced households was selected in destination sites with the 
largest influxes of displaced population during 1999.  The surveys were 
administered to 200 displaced households in Bogotá, Cartagena and Medellín. 
Distribution of the sample among the three cities was chosen according to the 
aggregate numbers of displaced population in each one. Questionnaires were 
applied only to households displacing from Antioquia and Cordoba, the 
departments with the highest records of population expulsion in 1999. The 
regional composition of the displaced sample was intentionally chosen with the 
objective of building a counterfactual sample of non-displaced population with a 
                                                 
14 A detailed description of the survey can be found in Kirchhoff and Ibáñez (2001).  similar regional composition. Since displaced households are clustered in specific 
neighborhoods in each city, households included in the sample were randomly 
chosen in these neighbors. Before interviewing a household, the enumerator 
asked two screening questions. The first question elicited whether the household 
was indeed forced to migrate due to violence and the second question asked 
about the site of origin. The non-displaced sample was composed of 176 surveys 
of households residing in conflict zones traditionally affected by displacement and 
located in Antioquia and Cordoba.  The size and distribution of the non-displaced 
sample was chosen according to displacement figures by municipalities. 
Households in each expulsion municipality were randomly chosen.  Although the 
survey provides valuable information about forced displacement in Colombia, the 
sample was not representative of the displaced population; therefore, results 
cannot be generalized.  
As described above, the sample was constructed based on choices – 
displacement and non-displacement – rather than on decision-makers. As such, 
an exogenous sampling process, where decision makers are selected and their 
choices observed, was not followed. Choice based sample, if not treated 
adequately, render biased parameter estimates. To address this problems, 
weights defined by Manski and Lerman (1977) were calculated and use to 
calculate descriptive statistics as well as to estimate the regressions.   
To construct the weights for the displaced sample ( )
d
i w , we calculated the 
fraction of the displaced population selecting each municipality where the survey 
was conducted ( )
d
i Q
15 and the analogous fraction for the choice based sample 
( )
d
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The weight for the non-displaced sample ( )
nd
i w is 
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where 
nd
i Q represents the fraction of the population that stayed in the municipality 
where the survey was conducted and
nd
i H  the analogous fraction for the choice 
based sample. By weighting each contribution of the log-likelihood by these 
weights, we obtain unbiased parameter estimates. 
Table 1 presents the weighted descriptive statistics for the displaced and non-
displaced sample.  The descriptive statistics provide some initial insights on 
displacement behavior.  First, displaced and non-displaced households are 
exposed to high violence levels.  Near 78 percent of displaced households and 
nine percent of non-displaced households faced direct threats in the origin site.  
Moreover, few households have not confronted indirect violence
16: 99 percent of 
displaced households and 75 percent of non-displaced households reported 
being victims of indirect violence.  Second, non-displaced households feel more 
protected by government forces.  In contrast to non-displaced households, 
displaced households perceive a greater presence of paramilitary and guerrilla in 
their hometown and a weaker presence of police forces.  Third, evidence 
suggests violence is not randomly targeted.   Displaced households are 
landowners in larger proportions, are headed by younger heads, and have larger 
consumption aggregates
17 than non-displaced households.  Land size, however, 
is larger for non-displaced households, which may imply that illegal armed groups 
mostly target landowners with small farms or that the opportunity cost from 
abandoning large land plots is larger.  Lastly, non-displaced apparently have a 
higher access to public investment because they are better educated and have 
more access to basic social services
18 when compared to displaced households.  
 
                                                 
16 A household was defined to confront indirect violence when a nearby town or when friends and 
family were the victims of attacks by illegal armed groups, massacres, bombs or any other type of 
violence.  
17 Appendix I describes the methodology used to predict rural and urban aggregate 
consumptions.  
18 Access to basic social services is a dummy variable equal to one when the household has 
access to education and health. Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
 a 
Variable Displaced  Non  Displaced 
  Mean Variance  Mean  Variance 
Direct threat  0.78   0.09  
Indirect violence  0.99   0.75  
Paramilitary presence   0.97   0.66  
Guerilla presence  0.96   0.50  
Military presence  0.92   0.90  
Police presence  0.58   0.90  
Contacts – reception site  0.87   0.74  
Years of residence – origin site  15.53 4.10 21.01 1.04 
Own land  0.80   0.06  
Standardized land size  -0.22 0.12 0.01 0.02 
Access to social services  0.34   0.91  
Household education  7.37 0.49 9.01 0.30 
Access to media  2.79 0.42 3.35 0.11 
Rural annual consumption 
b 1.37 0.11 1.28 0.07 
Urban annual consumption 
b 2.14 0.29 1.51 0.08 
Age household head  33.71 1.98 43.93 1.11 
Male household head  0.90 0.60  
Number of organizations  0.26 0.13 0.27 0.04 
Source: Authors calculations based on SIDP-2000 
a. Calculated using Manski weights 
b. In million pesos 
 
4.2. Estimation  results 
Aggressions against the civil population are not randomly targeted.  The previous 
section provides evidence that illustrates that illegal armed group may attack 
households with particular characteristics; consequently, direct threats are 
endogenous.  In order to reduce endogeneity problems, we estimate the reduced 
form for the probability of being the victim of a death threat and the probability of 
displacement. Because finding a variable determining the probability of direct 
threats but not the probability of displacement was difficult, we did not use the 
instrumental variable approach. 
4.2.1. The Probability of Being a Victim of a Death Threat 
Table 2 reports the results for the probability of being victim of a death threat.  
The most likely to be victims of direct threats are large landowners, families with 
young household heads and female headed households. Conversely, families 
with larger consumption aggregates are less likely to be terrorized, probably 
because they are better able to adopt defensive measures against illegal armed 
groups.  These results confirm the hypotheses developed in the literature about displacement in Colombia: illegal armed groups violently appropriate land and 
threat young members of the community as part of a war strategy.  Surprisingly, 
the number of organizations, a proxy for leadership of the household in the 
community, is significant, but decreases the odds of being threatened. Two 
interpretations are possible. On the one hand, illegal armed groups may target 
leaders in the community and the number of organizations is not a measure of 
leadership. On the other hand, membership to organizations can provide 
protections to its members, reducing the probability of victimization.  
Estimations indicate as well that households residing in zones of paramilitary 
presence are threatened with a larger probability whereas guerrilla presence 
does not seem to have a significant effect on threats.  This result should be 
carefully analyzed.  When the SIDP-2000 survey was conducted, displacement 
occurred mainly as a consequence of paramilitary actions like threats and 
massacres.  Nevertheless, the dynamics of the conflict changed significantly 
during the last years and today guerrilla groups are responsible for many 
displacement events.  Lately, guerrilla attacks to small and medium municipalities 
have provoked large expulsions of population
19.   
Police protection deters threats from illegal armed groups to the population, 
preventing displacement, whereas military presence does not reduce the 
likelihood of threats. This is not surprising, as protection of the civil population 
requires a constant presence of the State and a reliable institution with strong 
links to the community.  While the police force embodies those conditions, the 
role of military forces is, to protect the population during armed conflict. Thus, the 
presence of the latter should not be expected to be permanent in each 
Colombian municipality.  
 
 
                                                 
19 For example, in May 2002 leftist guerrilla groups attacked Bojayá, a small municipality located 
on the Pacific Ocean.  As a result of the attack, 119 people died and 4.284 people were forced to 
displace (CE, 2002). This it the best known episode of an uninterrupted sequence of armed 
groups attacks against civilians, up to 2005. Table 2. Probability of Threats – Reduced form
 a 
Variable Coefficient  Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Indirect violence  -0.8100 
(-1.00) 
Presence of Military forces  0.7161 
(1.33) 
Presence of Police forces  -1.7135 
(-3.63)*** 
Presence of paramilitary groups  1.5122 
(2.21)** 
Presence of guerrilla groups  1.1227 
(1.56) 
Contact at reception site  -0.6790 
(-1.51) 
Access to media  0.5406 
(3.02)*** 
Years of residence – origin site  -0.0124 
(-0.75) 
Land ownership  0.2962 
(0.64) 
Standardized land size  1.5118 
(2.92)*** 
Access to social services  -0.9243 
(-2.00)** 
Household education  0.1401 
(1.83)* 
Rural consumption per capita 
b -0.0039 
(-4.37)*** 
Urban consumption per capita 
b 0.0024 
(4.60)*** 
Age household head  -0.0112 
(-0.61) 
Male household head  -1.4209 
(-2.54)*** 
Number of organizations  -0.4754 
(-2.02)** 
Number of observations  345 
Pseudo R-square  0.6435 
Source: Authors calculations based on SIDP-2000 
a. Estimated using Manski weights 
b. In thousand pesos 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
 
4.2.2.  Determinants of Displacement  
The displacement model defined in section III is estimated using maximum 
likelihood procedures.  Three models are estimated.  The first is the Aggregated 
Model that makes no distinction between preventive and reactive displacement.  In the next section, we estimate a model distinguishing preventive from reactive 
displacement. 
Table 3 reports estimation results for the Aggregated Model. Variables capturing 
security perception are significant and their coefficients are large, implying 
Security perceptions are the dominant predictor of displacement.  The 
occurrence of indirect violence pushes household to flee their hometown. While 
military and police presence dissuade displacement, the existence of illegal 
armed groups – paramilitary or guerrilla – promotes displacement.  
Displacement costs, though significant, do not counterbalance the effects of 
violence in the origin site.  Households with access to basic social services are 
less likely to displace.  Access to media dissuades displacement, probably by 
providing information about difficulties families face in reception sites, dissuades 
displacement.  However, the joint effect of both variables is not enough to 
compensate the influence of indirect violence let alone the presence of illegal 
armed groups in the region.  Surprisingly, contacts availability at reception, which 
reduces migration costs, is not statistically significant.  
Consumption indicators in the displacement decision behave similarly to those in 
migration models.  Foregone consumption in the origin site decreases the 
chances of displacement while consumption opportunities in the destination site 
induce displacement.  Unlike results in traditional migration models, better-
educated household are less willing to displace; probably better off households 
are able to adopt protective measures or have more accurate information 
regarding the opportunities in reception sites and prefer not to displace.  
Household characteristics partially determine the decision to displace.   
Households with younger heads are more inclined to displace.  As previously 
discussed, young individuals are likely to be possible targets of illegal armed 
groups.  In addition, the tendency of younger heads to migrate may reflect risk 
preferences of households and is a standard result in the migration literature.   Risk variables, like land ownership and insertion of the family in the community, 
are push factors. First, land ownership, which was not statistically significant for 
the direct threat estimations, is positive and significant, showing land owners are 
targeted by illegal armed groups. Second, years of residence, an imperfect proxy 
for the thickness of the households’ insertion in the community, and the number 
of organizations increase the probability of displacement. Because the regression 
estimates the reduced form coefficients, these three variables may be capturing 
the deliberate targeting of community leaders by illegal armed groups. 
Table 3. Probability of Displacement – Reduced Form
 a 
Variable Coefficient  Estimate 
(t-stat) 
Indirect violence  2.4112 
(3.77)*** 
Presence of Military forces  -2.0446 
(-4.04)*** 
Presence of Police forces  -3.7317 
(-4.49)*** 
Presence of paramilitary groups  4.3127 
(5.89)*** 
Presence of guerrilla groups  2.1658 
(5.77)*** 
Contact at reception site  0.4831 
(1.56) 
Access to media  -0.4316 
(-3.57)*** 
Years of residence – origin site  0.0303 
(2.82)*** 
Land ownership  1.4728 
(3.05)*** 
Standardized land size  0.0510 
(0.28) 
Access to social services  -1.6638 
(-3.92)*** 
Household education  -0.1349 
(-4.22)*** 
Rural consumption per capita 
b -0.0032 
(-4.75)*** 
Urban consumption per capita 
b 0.0023 
(3.81)*** 
Age household head  -0.0835 
(-5.77)*** 
Male household head  -0.3281 
(-1.21) 
Number of organizations  1.0670 
(3.90)*** 
Number of observations  345
Pseudo R-square  0.6665
Source: Authors calculations based on SIDP-2000 a. Estimated using Manski weights 
b. In thousand pesos 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
 
Empirical estimation confirms violence modifies the benefits and costs of 
migration when life threats, lack of rule of law and violation of property rights 
prevail.  Violence and aggressions against the civil population modifies the 
migration incentives of education and location specific assets, like land and social 
capital.  Other migration determinants, like consumption indicators and access to 
basic social services, influence displacement decisions in the expected direction.  
Military and police protection reduce displacement although in different stages of 
the process.  Police protection is paramount to ease aggressions of illegal armed 
groups to the civil population.  Once aggressions against the civil population 
faces unfold, military and police presence are important instruments to halt 
displacement.    
4.3.  Modeling Two Displacement Types: Preventive and Reactive 
 
The previous model is now estimated for preventive and reactive displacement.  
We refer to preventive displacement when households identified “fear despite not 
being threatened” as reason for fleeing their hometown.  Results for the 
preventive and reactive model are presented in Table 4.  
Perceptions of security variables are similar in the preventive and reactive 
displacement models.  Indirect violence continues to be an important determinant 
of displacement.  Presence of government forces and illegal armed groups are 
also significant for both models, but are stronger for preventive displacement. 
These results may suggest the more risk averse self-select into preventive 
displacement since the mere presence of illegal armed groups prompts 
displacement, despite not being the victim of a threat.  
Traditional migration determinants are stronger for preventive displacement. 
Educations of household heads, consumption aggregates, access to social services, although significant for both models, are much stronger for preventive 
displacement. Moreover, contacts at reception site, which were not significant for 
the aggregate model, are positive and significant for preventive displacement. 
When households displace preventively, the decision-making process is less 
hasty, allowing families to assess benefits and costs of migration. As a result, 
traditional migration variables are more important vis-à-vis reactive displacement.  
On the other hand, the influence of access to media and years of residence is 
different to reactive displacement in contract to preventive displacement. Access 
to media is a deterrent for reactive displacement whereas is not significant to halt 
preventive displacement. Furthermore, the impact of access to media to reduce 
displacement outweighs variables like access to social services and presence of 
military forces. Possibly, the perspective of facing dire conditions in reception 
sites is an effective instrument to deter reactive displacement. Years of 
residence, while negative for preventive displacement, is positive for reactive 
displacement. The former might indicate the migration costs of leaving behind the 
web of social networks when migrating, whereas the latter may denote, as 
explained previously, insertion of the household in the community and, as a 

















































































Number of observations  233 281 
Pseudo R-square  0.7665 0.6954 
Source: Authors calculations based on SIDP-2000 
a. Estimated using Manski weights 
b. In thousand pesos 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
 
Empirical findings show violence, security perceptions, migration costs and 
traditional migration variables remain significant for both types of displacement. 
However, the behavior of preventive and reactive types is partially different. 
Security perceptions and traditional migration variables exert a stronger influence on preventive displacement, implying preventive displacement allows families to 
analyze better the benefits and costs from forced migration.  
4.5. Welfare  Losses 
 
Welfare losses are estimated using the parameters from the probability of 
displacement for the aggregated model, the preventive model and the reactive 
model. Welfare losses are calculated for each household by incorporating the 
characteristics of the household on the definition for compensating variation 
derived in Appendix I. Welfare losses are presented as the percentage of the net 
present value of rural aggregate consumption
20. To estimate the net present 
value of rural aggregate consumption, we assume the remaining life span of the 
household after displacement is equal to life expectancy in rural areas minus the 
age of the household head. Life expectancy is differentiated by gender.  
Welfare losses from displacement are substantial.  In fact, the costs from 
displacement amount to 37 per cent of the net present value of aggregated rural 
consumption (See Table 5).  Figure 6 shows the cumulative distribution of 
welfare losses as a percentage of net present value of rural aggregate 
consumption. Nearly 80 percent of households experience welfare losses above 
40 percent of the net present value of the aggregated rural consumption. 
Table 5. Welfare Losses as Percentage of Lifetime Household 
Consumption* 
      Mean and Standard Deviation 
 %  of  Lifetime 
Consumption 
Mean (s.d) 
Aggregated Model  37% 
(66%) 
Preventive Displacement  20% 
(37%) 
Reactive Displacement  33% 
(55%) 
Source: Authors calculations based on SIDP-2000 
Note: (*) Net present value 
                                                 
20 The estimation of aggregate consumption and the net present value of rural aggregate 
consumption is presented in Appendix II.  When welfare losses are estimated for preventive and reactive displacement, we 
find preventive displacement generates lower welfare losses, 20 per cent, in 
contrast to reactive displacement, 33 per cent (Table 5).  Because preventive 
displacement allows families to mitigate the impact of migration by selling assets, 
protecting land and contacting family and friends in receptions sites, welfare 
losses are lower.  
The economic burden of displacement is higher for poor households.  Figure 7 
plots the average welfare losses as a percentage of lifetime consumption per 
rural consumption quartile
21.  Welfare losses as a percentage of lifetime 
consumption decrease significantly as households are better off, with a particular 
steep decline for households located in the fourth quartile. While displaced 
households located in the first and second consumption quartile confront median 
losses near to 72 and 41 percent of lifetime consumption, welfare losses for 
households located in the fourth quartile average approximately 6 percent. 
Moreover, Figure 7 shows larger dispersion of welfare losses among poor 
households and more frequent cases of extremely high welfare losses.  
Unfortunately, the economic literature does not provide similar estimations to 
compare the size of welfare losses from displacement in Colombia. However, 
comparisons with estimates of the costs disease or crime show that the burden of 
displacement for the victims is much higher. Total economic losses to victims of 
crime, including medical costs and lost work time, during 1992 in the United 
States were measured in $532 per crime (Klaus, 1994). Levitt (1995) obtains a 
much higher estimate as the cost of pain, suffering and economic loss for the 
average crime in the United States around $3.000 in the US, equivalent at most 
to 12 per cent of GDP per capita. Londoño (1998) calculates human capital 
losses in Colombia originating from violence around four percent of GDP each 
year. Other points of comparison are Rubio’s (1997) estimate of total household 
expenditures on protection and security, which amounts to 1.4 percent of the 
Colombian GDP, and the total burden of disease per year in Latin America that 
                                                 
21 Per capita consumption quartiles for rural areas were calculated using the ECV-1997. amounts to 0.2 Disease Adjusted Life Years –DALYs- per person. In summary, 
displaced populations show a comparatively high index of vulnerability, when 
compared to other types of risks that are addressed by publicly funded programs. 
4. Conclusions 
Forced displacement modeling diverges from traditional migration modeling. 
Many key determinants of migration have the opposite effect in the context of 
forced displacement.  Our empirical findings confirm this hypothesis.  Violence at 
the origin site modifies the migration incentives of education and location specific 
assets, like land and social capital.   
Large welfare losses justify policy intervention.  Economic costs of displacement 
are in average 40 per cent of the net present value of aggregated rural 
consumption.  Moreover, poorer families experience larger welfare losses.  In 
fact, some households present welfare losses above 80 percent of the net 
present value of aggregated rural consumption.  
Our estimations provide evidence on possible policy instruments to prevent 
displacement. Violence and security perceptions are the major determinants of 
displacement and are, thereby, the key instrument in preventing displacement. 
Other interventions have a marginal effect on displacement and cannot 
compensate the effect of direct threats and indirect violence.  However, police 
and military protection can mitigate displacement.  While police presence 
prevents direct threats, military and police presence are instrumental to protect 
the population once displacement is imminent.  On the other hand, economic 
variables, like access to basic social services or access to information, mildly 
prevent displacement.  
The link between access to land and displacement merits a separate discussion. 
By increasing the probability of being the victim of a threat and the odds of 
displacement, access to land constitutes a risk factor. Deliberate attacks to 
civilians seek to depopulate territory in order to obtain the loot, to reduce the 
fighting capacity of the enemy, to expand control areas and to appropriate valuable land (Azam and Hoefler, 2002, Reyes and Bejarano, 1998). Policies to 
strengthen property rights, like granting land titles, or to solve land conflicts, like 
redistribution of land, could decrease the pressure of armed groups upon 
landowners, preventing therefore displacement.  References 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Derivation of Compensating Variation
22  
 
The utility from displacement for household i is defined as 
id i id id id d id id Z C Y S U ε γ δ β α + + + + = . 
On the other hand, the utility for household i from residing in the origin site is 
in i in in in n in in Z C Y S U ε γ δ β α + + + + = . 
The money value necessary to equate the utility before and after displacement is 
equivalent to  
( ) in i in in i in n in id i id id id d id Z C CV Y S Z C Y S ε γ δ β α ε γ δ β α + + + − + = + + + + ,  
which becomes 
n
id in i id in id in id d in n id in
i
Z C C Y Y S S
CV
β
ε ε γ γ δ β β α − + − + − + − + −
=
) ( ) ( ) (
. 
Since  id ε  and  in ε  are random variables with mean zero, the expected 
compensating variation is defined as 
[]
n
i id in id in id d in n id in
i
Z C C Y Y S S
CV E
β
γ γ δ β β α ) ( ) ( ) ( − + − + − + −
= . 
                                                 
22 The derivation of the compensating variation draws on Hanemann (1984).  
APPENDIX II 
 
Prediction of consumption aggregate 
 
To estimate the consumption aggregate of SIDP-2000 households, we estimated 
a regression for the micro determinants of consumption for urban and rural areas 
utilizing the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida (1997). The coefficients from the 
estimation were used to predict urban and rural consumption for displaced 
households. To estimate the net present value of rural aggregate consumption, 
we assume the remaining life span of the household after displacement is equal 
to life expectancy in rural areas minus the age of the household head. Life 
expectancy is differentiated by gender. According to the World Health 
Organization life expectancy in the Colombian rural areas is 76.3 years for 
women and 67.5 for men. A discount rate of 9.5% was used.  
Based on Wodon (1999) and the results for Vélez (2002), we included the 
following determinants of consumption included: (i) regional controls; (ii) 
household size variables: the number of babies, children and adults; (iii) other 
demographic and gender variables such as gender and age of household head 
as well as family structure; (iv) education variables: education of the household 
head and education of the spouse; and (v) the standardized amount of land 
owned for rural areas. Results for the urban and rural estimation are presented in 






 Table II.1. Estimate for log of rural consumption 
 
Source: Authors calculation based on Encuesta de Calidad de Vida (1997) 
*Municipal controls included 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
 
Variable Coefficient  estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Number of children under 2 years 
-0.0810 
(-1.32) 
Number of children under 2 years squared 
0.0310 
(0.75) 
Number of children between 3 and 13 years 
0.0324 
(1.69)* 




Number of adults (14-65) 
0.1989 
(9.07)*** 
Number of adults (14-65) squared 
-0.0119 
(-3.44)*** 
Age household head 
0.0093 
(2.16)** 
Age household head squared 
-0.0001 
(-3.37)*** 
Male household head 
0.0975 
(2.47)*** 
Years of education household head  
0.0326 
(3.74)*** 
Years of education household head squared 
0.0005 
(0.70) 
Years of education spouse 
0.0274 
(3.20)*** 












Adjusted R-Square  0.3029
F Test  18.34 
Table II.2 Estimate for log of urban consumption 
 
Source: Authors calculation based on Encuesta de Calidad de Vida (1997) 
*Municipal controls included 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 





Number of children under 2 years 
-0.112* 
(-1.77) 
Number of children under 2 years squared 
0.0567 
(1.27) 
Number of children between 3 and 13 years 
0.0146 
(0.72) 




Number of adults (14-65) 
0.2137 
(11.74)*** 
Number of adults (14-65) squared 
-0.0173 
(-5.96)**** 
Age household head 
0.0183 
(4.78)*** 
Age household head squared 
-0.0002 
(-5.63)*** 
Male household head 
0.1758 
(5.23)*** 
Years of education household head  
-0.0020 
(-0.31) 
Years of education household head squared 
0.0024 
(7.00)*** 
Years of education spouse 
0.0001 
(0.02) 









Adjusted R-square  0.3956
F Test  32.93 
 
 
Figure 1. Displacement Intensity by Department  2002








  Source: Ibáñez and Vélez (2003) 
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Figure 6. Kernel Density for Welfare Losses as a Percentage of Lifetime 
Consumption 
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    Median
1st Quartile
    Welfare 
Source: Authors calculations based on SIDP-2000 
   Note: Income distribution quartiles are calculated from ECV 1997 for rural areas.      
  
 